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I. INTRODUCTION
The worst methane gas leak in United States history and one of the largest
lead contamination disasters slammed two Southern California communities in
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2015.1 These two environmental disasters in Vernon and Porter Ranch,
California, may have caused long lasting, adverse health effects.2 The California
State Legislature sought to aid these specific victims by passing AB 2748, which
would have rendered certain waivers of liability unenforceable, extended the
statute of limitations to seek legal recourse, and awarded attorney’s fees to
prevailing plaintiffs in private nuisance actions.3 The legislative effort to aid
these victims failed as a result of the Governor’s veto.4 Before discussing the
legal implications of AB 2748 were it enacted successfully, the remainder of the
introduction sets the scene as to what happened during each environmental
disaster: Part A of this section describes the events of the Exide Technologies
lead contamination in Vernon, California.5 Part B of this section describes the
details of the Aliso Canyon methane gas leak in Porter Ranch, California.6
A. Lead Contamination in Vernon, California
In 2015, parents in Vernon began complaining that the nearby battery
recycling plant operated by Exide Technologies (Exide) caused their children to
suffer developmental delays, deafness, vision problems, and other physical
ailments commonly associated with high levels of lead exposure.7 Lead is a
powerful neurotoxin that poses a huge risk for young children as they often play

* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2018; B.A.,
Political Science and B.A., Legal Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 2014. Thank you to the Board of
Editors of Vol. 48 of the Law Review for entrusting me with this great opportunity, and to my colleague and
friend Kendall Fisher for the competitive energy she brings to anything and everything. Lastly, I am thankful
for the love and support from my wonderful family and friends back home. Without all of you, law school
would still only be a dream, and not a reality.
1. Matt McGrath, California Methane Gas Leak ‘Largest in US History,’ BBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-35659947; Alejandro Davila Fragoso, The Massive Methane
Blowout In Aliso Canyon Was the Largest in US History, CLIMATE PROGRESS (Feb. 26, 2016),
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2016/02/26/3754378/gas-leak-largest-ever; Tony Barboza, Exide Cleanup:
Toxic Lead Removal Could be California’s Biggest Yet, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2015), available at
http://www.latimes. com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-exide-cleanup-20150817-story.html [hereinafter Barboza, Exide
Cleanup] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also infra Parts I.A. & I.B (describing the
details for the causes and effects of the two environmental disasters).
2. McGrath, supra note 1; Fragoso, supra note 1; Barboza, Exide Cleanup, supra note 1; see also infra
Parts I.A & I.B (describing the details for the causes and effects of the two environmental disasters).
3. Infra Part III (elaborating on AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1544; CAL. CIV. PROC. §§ 340.85, 1021.3).
4. Infra Part IV (analyzing the legal implications of AB 2747 as if Governor Jerry Brown did not veto the
bill); see also Edmund J. Brown, Jr., Letter of Veto Message from Governor Edmund J. Brown, Jr. to the
Members of the California State Assembly (Sept. 26, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
5. Infra Part I.A (describing the Exide Technologies lead contamination in Vernon, California).
6. Infra Part I.B (describing the Southern California Gas methane gas leak in Porter Ranch, California).
7. Jed Kim, In Los Angeles, Lack of Trust Makes Lead Cleanup Tougher, MARKETPLACE (May 5, 2016),
available at http://www.marketplace.org/2016/05/03/world/cleaning-lead-tougher-without-communitys-trust
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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outside and ingest soil and dust.8 California health officials confirmed that the
children living near the Exide battery plant have higher levels of lead in their
blood compared to those children living farther away.9
The 15-acre battery recycling facility previously operated around-the-clock
to process approximately 25,000 batteries a day, melting down lead from used
car batteries to produce new ones.10 The plant has spewed lead, arsenic, and other
dangerous pollutants for almost a century since 1922.11 More than 10,000 homes
have been affected by the lead contamination in six different Los Angeles
communities.12 The plant operated for at least 33 years without a full permit,
even after inspectors documented more than 100 environmental concerns.13
Citizen complaints of ash falling on nearby soil, streets, and businesses were
ineffective in resolving the growing environmental concern.14
In 2014, the federal Department of Justice launched a criminal
investigation.15 To avoid criminal prosecution, the Exide battery plant closed in
March 2015.16 The settlement required Exide to pay $50 million for a statesupervised pollution cleanup to remove the lead contamination.17 In 2016,
California Governor Jerry Brown directed an additional $176.6 million to
expedite and expand lead testing.18 Testing each home for lead costs about
$40,000 and a week to complete.19 This removal of lead-contaminated soil from
thousands of homes is the largest lead-removal project ever conducted in the
United States.20
8. Tony Barboza, How A Battery Recycler Contaminated L.A.-Area Homes For Decades, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 21, 2015), available at http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-exide-cleanup-story-so-far-20151121story.html [hereinafter Barboza, Battery Recycler] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review);
Barboza, Exide Cleanup, supra note 1.
9. CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, AN ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN’S BLOOD LEAD
LEVELS IN THE AREA AROUND THE EXIDE SITE (Apr. 8, 2016), available at https://www.dtsc.ca.gov/Hazardous
Waste/Projects/upload/An-Analysis-of-Children-s-Blood-Lead-Levels-in-the-Area-Around-the-Exide-Site.pdf
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Tony Barboza, Higher Levels of Lead Found in Blood
of Children Near Exide Plant in Vernon, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2016), available at http://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-exide-children-blood-lead-levels-20160408-story.html [hereinafter Barboza, Higher Levels
of Lead] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
10. Barboza, Battery Recycler, supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (explaining concerns including lead and acid leaks, an overflowing pond of toxic sludge,
enormous cracks in the floor, and high levels of lead in the soil).
14. Id.
15. Id., see also Tony Barboza, Federal Grand Jury Investigating Exide Technologies over Vernon Plant,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2016), available at http://www.latimes.com/science/la-me-0816-exide-feds-20140816story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
16. Barboza, Battery Recycler, supra note 8.
17. Barboza, Exide Cleanup, supra note 1.
18. Governor Brown Directs $176.6 Million To Bolster Exide Cleanup, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (Apr.
20, 2016), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=19388.
19. Barboza, Battery Recycler, supra note 8.
20. Id.; Barboza, Exide Cleanup, supra note 1.
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B. Methane Gas Leak in Porter Ranch, California
On October 23, 2015, Porter Ranch residents learned that more than 150
million pounds of methane leaked into the atmosphere in their own backyards.21
Since 1979, Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas) neglected to replace a
missing safety valve on a well because the valve was difficult to find and the well
was not considered “critical.”22
Although appearing non-threatening, “gas doesn’t know borders.”23 Large,
purple-stained clouds of methane gas that smelled like rotten eggs could be seen
rolling over the community with the help of scientific equipment.24 To add
context, 1,411,851 new cars would need to be added to the road this year to have
the same greenhouse gas effect.25 That is approximately 5.788 million trips
between New York and Los Angeles in a single car.26 Assuming we can drive on
water, we could circle Earth 648,351.8 times to get the same greenhouse gas
effect as the Exide methane gas leak.27 The leak released at least 8,156,400
metric tons of carbon dioxide.28
Victims experienced coughing, aches, pains, nosebleeds, and other flu-like
symptoms as a result of the pungent stench from methane additives.29
Approximately 11,296 families evacuated the area to nearby hotels, halting the
lives and businesses in the Porter Ranch community.30 Families have demanded
SoCalGas to fund their relocations to neighboring hotels.31
Hundreds of residents have filed claims against the government seeking $3.5
million in damages for failing to respond and mitigate the effects of the

21. Erin Brockovich, California Methane Gas Leak Is Worst U.S. Environmental Disaster Since BP Oil
Spill, DEMOCRACYNOW! (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.democracynow.org/2015/12/30/erin_brockovich_
california_methane_gas_leak.
22. Matt Ferner & Lydia O’Connor, Here’s What It’s Like to Live Next to California’s Gas Blowout
Catastrophe, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/california-methane-gasleak_us_568f004de4b0cad15e644090 (defining a “critical well” as a well within 100 feet of a road or park or
within 300 feet of a home).
23. Id.
24. Id.; mmforthepeople, Aliso Canyon SoCalGas Leak Video, YOUTUBE (Dec. 11, 2015), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1Fyevj25-o (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
25. Paul Blake, How Many Cars and Burping Cows Equal the California Gas Leak?, BBC NEWS (Jan.
11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35258036.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Samantha Page, Residents Sue Over ‘Negligent’ Practices by Gas Company, as Pipeline Leak Goes
Into Third Month, CLIMATE PROGRESS (Jan. 5, 2016), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2016/01/05/
3735802/porter-ranch-lawsuit/.
29. Ferner & O’Connor, supra note 22.
30. Id.; Blake, supra note 25.
31. Jane Mundy, No Christmas Tree for Porter Ranch Gas Leak Victims, LAWYERS AND SETTLEMENTS
(Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/articles/porter-ranch-socal-gas-leak/interview-porterranch-lawsuit-gas-leak21151.html?utm_expid=360752213.Y4u1ixZNSt6o8v_5N8VGVA.0&utm_referrer=
https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F.
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emergency.32 Most legal recourse has been directed against SoCalGas.33 The
California Attorney General sued SoCalGas for violating state health and safety
laws, creating a public nuisance, and violating California’s Unfair Competition
Law.34 Los Angeles County has filed criminal charges against SoCalGas for
failing to inform authorities immediately upon discovering the blowout.35
Business owners have filed lawsuits for losses related to the gas leak.36 Residents
have also filed charges against SoCalGas, alleging claims of injury and wrongful
death as a result of SoCalGas’ failure to replace the safety valve.37
The Vernon lead contamination victims claim that their community lacks the
media attention and resources needed to help with cleanup compared to the more
affluent Porter Ranch community.38 Thus, in direct response to these two
environmental catastrophes in Southern California, the California State
Legislature intended, although unsuccessfully, to bring justice to all victims by
leveling the litigation procedures under AB 2748.39
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
AB 2748 would have altered the litigation procedures for the residents
affected by Exide and SoCalGas by rendering certain waivers of liability
ineffective, extending statutes of limitations, and awarding attorney’s fees.40 Part
A of this section briefly summarizes the current law on contractual releases of

32. Staff Writer, California Governor and State Agencies Face Lawsuit in Aliso Canyon Gas Leak,
LAWYER HERALD (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.lawyerherald.com/articles/43298/20160420/california-alisocanyon-jerry-brown-southern-california-gas-co.htm.
33. See generally Attorney General Lodges Lawsuit Over the Aliso Canyon Gas Leak, Citing Violations
of State Health and Safety Laws, CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL (Feb. 2, 2016), https://oag.ca.gov/
news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-lodges-lawsuit-over-aliso-canyon-gas-leak (announcing
lawsuit against SoCalGas); Suzanne Goldenberg, Los Angeles Files Criminal Charges Against SoCalGas Over
Massive Gas Leak, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/02/losangeles-gas-leak-southern-california-gas-porter-ranch; Jonathan Lloyd & Patrick Healy, Family Files Wrongful
Death Lawsuit Over Porter Ranch Gas Leak, NBC LOS ANGELES (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.nbclosangeles.
com/news/local/Porter-Ranch-Aliso-Canyon-Gas-Leak-Wrongful-Death-Lawsuit-367517691.html (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review); Bryan Watt, Owners of 2 Businesses in Porter Ranch File Lawsuit
for Losses Related to Gas Leak, 89.3 KCPP (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.scpr.org/news/2016/01/25/57033/
owners-of-two-businesses-in-porter-ranch-file-laws/; Page, supra note 28.
34. CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 33.
35. Goldenberg, supra note 33.
36. Watt, supra note 33.
37. Page, supra note 28; Lloyd & Healy, supra note 33.
38. Melanie Mason, L.A.-Area and State Officials Call for Quicker Cleanup of Exide Plant
Contamination, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), available at http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-exidecleanup-legislators-20160126-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
39. Hearing on AB 2748 Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015),
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o6leD2Oejno (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
40. Infra Part III (elaborating on AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1544; CAL. CIV. PROC. §§ 340.85, 1023)).
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liability.41 Part B discusses the current statute of limitations for filing actions for
injury and wrongful death related to exposure to hazardous materials.42 Part C
outlines the current law governing attorney’s fees.43 Part D discusses the
causation issues in toxic tort litigation.44
A. Contractual Release of Liability
Under existing law, a tortfeasor may avoid liability by agreement, with or
without consideration.45 The theory of assumption of the risk supports that
plaintiffs can voluntarily and expressly consent to a known risk, reinforcing the
plaintiff’s freedom to enter into contracts on his or her own right.46 However, as a
matter of law and policy, a release of liability “does not extend to the claims” the
victim does not know of or have reason to know of “at the time of executing the
release,” which would have materially affected the victim’s settlement with the
polluter.47 Existing law also prohibits contracts that exempt the tortfeasor from
liability for willful injury.48
B. Two Year Statute of Limitations49 & The Discovery Rule
Current law provides that an action for injury or death to another individual
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another must commence within two
years of the injury.50 The California Court of Appeal for the Second District
previously held that a plaintiff has knowledge of the legal cause of his or her
injuries when the media extensively covers the release of toxic chemicals that
allegedly caused the plaintiff’s injuries.51 The California Senate disagreed; in
41. Infra Part II.A. (discussing the current California law on contractual releases of liability).
42. Infra Part II.B. (discussing the current California law on statutes of limitations for personal injury and
toxic tort claims).
43. Infra Part II.C. (discussing the current California law on attorney’s fees).
44. Infra Part II.D. (discussing current challenges and issues in proving causation in tort claims).
45. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1541 (West 2016); Cilibrasi v. Reiter, 103 Cal.App.2d 397, 399 (1951) (“It is a
familiar principle of adjective law that in the absence of rescission of a contract of settlement of a claim for
personal injuries accomplished according to law, and of a restoration of the consideration paid for the release of
the claim the release of the tort feasor is a valid contract and prevents recovery on the disputed claim.”)
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (June 2016
update) (providing in Comment k that “the rationale underlying contractual limitations on liability is that, in
appropriate circumstances, individuals should be able to agree who should bear a risk of injury.”)
47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1542 (West 2016); ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT OF AB 2748,
at 5 (June 2, 2016).
48. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2016); ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT OF AB 2748,
at 5 (June 2, 2016).
49. 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure § 433 (5th ed. 2012) (defining a statute of limitations as prescribing the
period of time for which actions may be brought in a court of law and providing that such a period of time is to
offer repose and prevent surprise claims).
50. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 335.1 (West 2016).
51. McKelvey v. North American Boeing, Inc., 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 161 (1999).
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response, they passed Senate Bill 331 to codify Section 340.8 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure.52 Section 340.8 codified the discovery rule laid out by
the California Supreme Court in Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.,53 which held that
publicized media reporting on hazardous material or toxic substance
contamination is not enough to alert victims that their injuries are caused by the
polluter.54
It is important to determine when a plaintiff is “on notice” of the cause of
injury because a plaintiff must file an action for injury as a result of hazardous
exposure to toxic substances within “two years after the plaintiff becomes aware
of (1) an injury, (2) the physical cause of the injury, and (3) sufficient facts to put
a reasonable person on inquiry notice that the injury was caused by the wrongful
act of another, whichever occurs later.”55
Section 340.8 further provides that the time for commencement of a
wrongful death must be “either (1) two years after the death of the decedent, or
(2) two years from the first date on which the plaintiff is aware of, or has reason
to be aware of the physical cause of wrongful death and sufficient facts to put a
reasonable person on inquiry notice that the death was caused by the wrongful
act of another.”56 Thus, the discovery rule creates a “fact-intensive” inquiry as to
when a plaintiff becomes sufficiently aware of a defendant’s alleged wrongdoing
for the purposes of triggering the statute of limitations.57
C. Calculating Attorney’s Fees in Tort Litigation
California law provides that “the measure and mode of compensation of
attorneys” is left to the agreement of the parties, and each party bears their own
costs.58 However, a prevailing party59 is entitled to its litigation costs.60 Parties
52. S.B. 331, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003); ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT OF AB
2748, at 6 (June 2, 2016).
53. Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110–11 (1988).
54. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (“Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run
when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done
something wrong to her. . . . A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific facts necessary to establish the claim;
that is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery. Once the plaintiff has suspicion of wrongdoing, and
therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So long as a suspicion
exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she cannot wait for the facts to find her.”); Norgart v.
Upjohn Co., 21 Cal.4th 383, 398 (1999); Clark v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 83 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1059 (2000);
SENATE FLOOR, COMM. ANALYSIS OF S.B 331, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess. (Sept. 8, 2003); ASSEMB. COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT OF AB 2748, at 6 (June 2, 2016).
55. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.8(a) (West 2016).
56. Id. § 340.8(b).
57. See, e.g., Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 230 Cal.App.3d 1125, 1150 (1991) (asserting that
whether the discovery rule applies is a matter of sufficient pleading of facts).
58. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1021 (West 2016); ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT OF AB 2748,
at 7 (June 2, 2016).
59. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1032(a)(4) (West 2016) (defining “prevailing party” as the party with a net
monetary recovery, including a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither
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may stipulate to alternative procedures for awarding costs in litigation.61 Under
existing law, attorney’s fees may be recovered as costs when a contract, statute,
or law authorizes it.62
D. The Causation Challenge of Toxic Tort Litigation
Causation is a significant challenge for toxic tort plaintiffs.63 A plaintiff
carries the burden in establishing a causal relationship between the defendant’s
conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.64 To show general causation in a toxic tort
claim, a plaintiff must show that the pollutant can cause the injury.65 “To prove
specific causation, the plaintiff must show that the exposure in fact caused the
plaintiff’s injury.”66 A court has discretion to examine the evidence it deems
appropriate for causation: statistical data, expert testimony, or both.67 Plaintiffs
cannot predict what a court will rely on.68 This uncertainty may lead to summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, thereby dismissing plaintiff’s case
altogether.69
Two California appellate decisions set the overarching rules for causation in
toxic tort litigation.70 First, causation in toxic tort cases must be established by
competent expert testimony rendered to a degree of reasonable medical
probability.71 Second, the plaintiff needs to produce enough evidence to
plaintiff or defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief
against that defendant).
60. Id. §§ 1021, 1032(b); see generally id. § 1033.5 (listing items allowed to be recovered as costs: filing
costs, motions, jury fees, juror food and lodging, depositions, court reporters, travel expenses, service of
process, premiums and surety bonds, witness fees, expert witness fees, transcripts).
61. Id. § 1032(c).
62. Id. § 1033.5(a)(10)(A)–(C); see, e.g., id. at § 1021.9 (allowing the prevailing party in a trespass action
to recover reasonable attorney’s fees).
63. Shelley Brinker, Opening the Door to the Indeterminate Plaintiff: An Analysis of the Causation
Barriers Facing Environmental Toxic Tort Plaintiffs, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1289, 1298 (1999); Joseph Sanders &
Julie Machal-Fulks. The Admissibility of Differential Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort
Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and Substantive Law, 64-AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110 (2001);
Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1439,
1446–1452 (2005); Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty
in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 499 (1988).
64. Brinker, supra note 63, at 1297.
65. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 292 F.3d 1124, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002); Lin, supra note
63, at 1446-47.
66. Lin, supra note 63, at 1447.
67. Brennan, supra note 63, at 499.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Akins v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 785, 809–10 (1992) (finding that
plaintiff has not raised any triable issues of material fact for personal injury and property damage, therefore
entitling defendant to judgment as a matter of law).
70. 2 Toxic Torts Prac. Guide § 36:2 (2016) (referring to Cottle v. Super. Ct., 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1384
(1992); Akins, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 809.
71. Cottle, 3 Cal.App.4th at 1384.
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demonstrate a triable issue of material fact linking defendant’s allegedly
wrongful conduct to the plaintiff’s injury to survive summary judgment.72 The
plaintiff often has a difficult time gathering enough evidence to get past this pretrial stage of litigation as plaintiff’s injuries may have multiple causes in between
defendant’s alleged wrongdoing and plaintiff’s injury.73 Thus, the plaintiff’s
burden to show causation is often “insurmountable.”74
III. AB 2748
The California Legislature considered AB 2748 a “special law” within the
definition of the California Constitution75 to specifically help the victims of the
Exide and SoCalGas environmental disasters, and not victims of similar
situations.76 Specifically, the purpose of the bill is to address the “lack of
sufficient legal remedies to help victims [of Exide and SoCalGas environmental
disasters] deal with the ramifications of environmental disaster” by increasing
“better access to remedies available to them through our judicial system.”77 Had
the Governor not vetoed the bill, AB 2748 would have added Civil Code § 154478
and Code of Civil Procedure §§ 340.8579 and 1021.380 to specifically aid
victims—each proposed code section being discussed in turn.
A. Cal. Civ. Code § 1544
If enacted, Civil Code § 1544 would have provided that a payment made by
the responsible polluter “in connection with an environmental disaster” would
“not release the polluter from liability” for any claim or future claim.81 However,
a payment made by the responsible polluter may be “credited against the liability
of the polluter” for any current or future claim that is related to the environmental

72. Akins, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d at 809–10.
73. Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 63, at 110.
74. Lin, supra note 63, at 1447.
75. See CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 16 (providing that all general laws have a uniform operation, and a specific
law is only invalid if a general statute could be made applicable).
76. ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT OF AB 2748, at 2 (June 2, 2016); Hearing on AB
2748 before the Sen. Judiciary Comm. 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015), available at https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=o6leD2Oejno (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). See AB 2748 § 4,
2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (“The Legislature finds and declares that a special law is necessary and
that a general law cannot be made applicable within the meaning of Section 16 of Article IV of the California
Constitution to achieve just and efficient results in civil litigation involving the unique circumstances of
damages resulting from specific environmental disasters.”)
77. See SEN. COMM. ON ENV. QUALITY, COMM. REPORT OF AB 2748, at 4 (June 28, 2016).
78. AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1544).
79. Id. (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.85).
80. Id. (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1021.3).
81. Id. (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1544(a)).
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disaster.82 A settlement “made in connection with an environmental disaster by
the responsible polluter” would have released the responsible polluter from
liability only for acts or injuries, which are believed to have occurred prior to the
settlement.83 Section 1544 would have rendered any agreements made on or
before February 1, 2017, void as a matter of law and public policy.”84
B. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.85
If enacted, Code of Civil Procedure § 340.85 would have provided a new
statute of limitations for filing a civil action arising out of injury, illness, or
wrongful death arising from the lead contamination at Exide or the methane
pollution at Porter Ranch.85 A lawsuit for injury and illness would have had to
commence within three years from the date of injury or three years after the
plaintiff becomes aware, or reasonably should have become aware (1) of an
injury, (2) of the physical cause of the injury, and (3) of “sufficient facts to put a
reasonable person on inquiry notice” of the injury and cause.86 A wrongful death
action would have had to commence within three years from the date of the
decedent’s death or three years from the first date on which the plaintiff is aware
“or reasonably should have been aware of the physical cause of death.”87 The
proposed statute of limitations of three years does not apply to an action based on
exposure to asbestos under Section 340.288 or an action against a health care
provider under Section 340.5.89
Additionally, Section 340.85(c)(2) incorporates the discovery rule set forth in
Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. by declaring that “media reports regarding the hazardous
material or toxic substance contamination are not enough” to put a person on
inquiry notice that injury or death is caused by the lead contamination or gas
leak.90
C. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.3
Section 1021.3 would have permitted the court to “award reasonable
attorneys’ fees to a prevailing plaintiff” against the polluter-defendant in any
private nuisance action the defendant has been “adjudged civilly liable.”91

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1544(b)).
Id. (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1544(c)).
Id. (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1544(d)).
Id. (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.85(a)).
Id. (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.85(a)).
Id. (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.85(b)).
Id. (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.85(c)(1) (referring to CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.2 (West 2016)).
Id. (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.85(c)(1) (referring to CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.5 (West 2016)).
Id. (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.85(c)(2)).
Id. (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1021.3(a)).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The legislative intent behind AB 2748 was to assist victims of these
environmental disasters with prosecuting their tort actions.92 The extent to which
AB 2748 would have assisted the victims is questionable.93 Part A elaborates on
public policy issues of AB 2748.94 Part B briefly discusses the benefits of having
an attorney’s fees provision in the Code of Civil Procedure.95 Part C discusses the
legal hurdles plaintiffs would still encounter even if AB 2748 were successfully
enacted.96 Part D looks at previously proposed replacements for the current
causation model.97 Part E discusses the reasons why California Governor Jerry
Brown vetoed AB 2748.98
A. Leaving the Litigation Window Wide Open
AB 2748 allows more time for litigation to commence and more claims to be
filed.99 Generally, it is permissible for victims of environmental toxic torts to
enter into agreements and waive any claims they may have for injuries by settling
with the polluter.100 AB 2748 would have rendered any agreements made by the
parties that would waive the polluters’ liability ineffective.101 Thus, AB 2748
preserves any claims the plaintiff may have for future litigation.102 AB 2748 also

92. Id. (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1544; CAL. CIV. PROC. §§ 340.85, 1023); Hearing on AB 2748 Before
the Sen. Judiciary Comm. 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015), available at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=o6leD2Oejno (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
93. See infra Part IV.A (explaining how AB 2748 treads on the freedom to contract between parties and
the purposes of statutes of limitations); infra Part IV.B (commending AB 2748 for encouraging settlement in
private nuisance actions); infra Part IV.C (discussing how causation hurdles remain and lurk, especially after
lengthening the statute of limitation period for filing toxic tort suits); infra Part IV.D (exploring other options of
causation models that can help plaintiffs prevail in toxic tort litigation).
94. Infra Part IV.A (explaining how AB 2748 treads on the freedom to contract between parties and the
purposes of statutes of limitations).
95. Infra Part IV.B (commending AB 2748 for encouraging settlement in private nuisance actions).
96. Infra Part IV.C (discussing how causation hurdles remain and lurk, especially after lengthening the
statute of limitations period for filing toxic tort suits).
97. Infra Part IV.D (exploring other options of causation models that can help plaintiffs prevail in toxic
tort litigation).
98. Infra Part IV.E (discussing Governor Brown’s reasons for vetoing AB 2748).
99. AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1544(c) and CAL. CIV.
PROC. § 340.85) (the un-waived claims means more issues to litigate, and an extended statute of limitations
means more time to file the un-waived claims); supra Part III.A (analyzing the effect AB 2748 would have had
on the ability of plaintiffs to bring these claims).
100. C.f. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1542, 1668 (West 2016) (suggesting that agreements to waive any claims
would likely be enforceable as long as they do not violate law or public policy).
101. AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1544(a) & (c)); supra
Part III.A. (discussing the effect that AB 2748 would have had on any release of a polluter’s liability).
102. AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1544(a) & (c)); supra
Part III.A. (finding that AB 2748 would have protected a plaintiff’s ability to bring currently unknown claims
when they are discovered in the future).
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extends the statute of limitations to three years.103 The combination of these two
new provisions preserves potential claims and extends the time for plaintiffs to
bring these claims—keeping the litigation window open for plaintiffs.104 AB
2748 favors plaintiffs by preserving their rights to bring a claim to court with a
lengthier statute of limitations and rendering any waivers of liability
ineffective.105 Keeping this window open for future litigation potentially
interferes with two fundamental public policies: the freedom for parties to
contract106 and the purpose of statute of limitations.107
1. Violating the Freedom to Contract?
It is widely accepted that the freedom to contract is fundamental in American
law.108 Public policy encourages settlement, vis-à-vis the entering into contracts,
in lieu of litigation in the interest of judicial efficiency and economy for the
courts and the parties involved.109 It is not uncommon for parties who settle to
include “release” clauses within agreements.110 Prohibiting the use of release
clauses in settlement agreements between the victims and their respective
polluters would encourage additional, if not excessive amounts of, litigation and
would be contrary to the policy of promoting contractual settlements.111
SoCalGas and Exide will have likely argued that AB 2748, which would have

103. AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. §§ 340.85(a) & (b));
supra Part III.A. (analyzing how AB 2748 would have extended the statute of limitations).
104. See supra Parts III.A. & III.B. (explaining that AB 2748 procedurally benefits the plaintiff by
allowing more time to file claims and making any waivers of liability void, thus preserving potentially viable
claims for a longer period of time); infra Parts IV.A.1. & IV.A.2. (same).
105. See generally supra Parts III.A. & III.B. (discussing the procedural benefits AB 2748 would have
provided to plaintiffs); infra Parts IV.A.1 & IV.A.2 (same).
106. Infra Part IV.A.1 (explaining why AB 2748 may have violated the freedom to contract).
107. Infra Part IV.A.2 (explaining why AB 2748 may have undermined the purpose of statutes of
limitations).
108. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2016) (implying that a contract not contrary to policy of law is
enforceable); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 406 (1937) (affirming that the freedom of contract
is a general rule and that the freedom to contract can be restrained in exceptional circumstances); VL Systems,
Inc. v. Unisen, Inc., 152 Cal.App.4th 708, 713 (2007) (affirming that the freedom of contract is an important
principle, and courts should not blithely apply public policy reasons to void contract provisions).
109. Kaufman v. Goldman, 195 Cal.App.4th 734, 745 (2011) (citing Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide, 157
Cal.App.4th 1471, 1475 (2007); quoting Nicholson v. Barab, 233 Cal.App.3d 1671, 1683 (1991) (“[W]e note
that there is a well-established policy in the law to discourage litigation and favor settlement. Pretrial
settlements are highly favored because they diminish the expense of litigation.”).
110. CALIFORNIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Letter from California Chamber of Commerce to Senate
Judiciary Committee, CALIFORNIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (June 14, 2016); see generally City of Santa
Barbara v. Super. Ct., 41 Cal.4th 747, 759 (2007) (finding that lower courts have consistently upheld release of
liability in cases of ordinary negligence related to gymnasiums, fitness clubs, auto and motorcycle events, ski
resorts, bicycle races, hypnotism, and scuba diving).
111. CALIFORNIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 110; see also Tunkl v. Regents of the University
of California, 60 Cal.2d 92, 94 (1963) (providing a classic example of an invalid releases of liability that as a
matter of policy would further litigation).
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denied them the right to contractually waive liability, is contrary to public policy
supporting private settlement of matters outside of court.112
On the other hand, the State has a competing interest in ensuring plaintiffs
bring their claims to court so they can recover damages to compensate their
injuries.113 Generally, toxic tort victims, like the victims of the SoCalGas
methane gas leak and the Exide lead contamination, do not know they have an
action for legal recourse because they have no immediate harm for which to seek
damages.114 If all Exide and Porter Ranch victims were able to contractually
waive their claims for liability, polluters would try to expeditiously settle with
every single victim to lower their own litigation costs as much as possible.115
Doing so would not advance the goal of tort law to fully compensate these
victims.116 In large-scale environmental toxic torts, there are competing goals of
preserving the polluters right to contract a waiver of liability and of making a
plaintiff whole again.117 AB 2748 advanced the latter goal for plaintiffs; but
almost certainly, an argument could be made that AB 2748 treaded on the
polluters’ right to freely enter into contracts and support the policy of
settlement.118
2. Defeating the Purpose of the Statute of Limitations?
Statutes of limitations provide defendants with reasonable repose to protect
them from defending stale claims and to require plaintiffs to diligently pursue

112. CALIFORNIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 110; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2016)
(potentially allowing for the argument that AB 2748 violates the public policy of the freedom to contract); see
also Kaufman, 195 Cal.App.4th at 745 (establishing that public policy favors settlements in lieu of litigation)).
113. Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal.4th 503, 516 (1994).
114. See, e.g., Susan Abram, Two Months In, Porter Ranch Gas Leak Compared to BP Gulf Oil Spill,
L.A. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 19, 2015), available at http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20151219/twomonths-in-porter-ranch-gas-leak-compared-to-bp-gulf-oil-spill (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (citing that the Department of Public Health has stated that the trace levels of methane can produce
significant long-term health effects, but is unsure whether the additive mercaptan is deadly); see also ASSEMB.
COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT OF AB 2748, at 3 (June 2, 2016) (stating that it is difficult to know what
the long-term effects of the methane exposure would be and that additional research will be conducted by the
University of Southern California).
115. Kaufman, 195 Cal.App.4th at 745 (citing Zhou, 157 Cal.App.4th at 1475; quoting Nicholson v.
Barab, 233 Cal.App.3d 1671, 1683 (1991) (“[W]e note that there is a well-established policy in the law to
discourage litigation and favor settlement. Pretrial settlements are highly favored because they diminish the
expense of litigation.”)).
116. Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash.2d 674, 682 (2007); Applied Equipment Corp, 7 Cal.4th at 516.
117. Compare Kaufman, 195 Cal.App.4th at 745 (finding a state interest in privately settling disputes),
with Applied Equipment Corp, 7 Cal.4th at 516 (finding a state interest in fully compensating plaintiffs for
injuries sustained as a result of tortious conduct).
118. Supra Part III.A. (discussing that argument regarding pollutants’ right to freedom of contract); see
generally ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT OF AB 2748, at 2 (June 2, 2016) (stating that the bill
proposes several remedies to assist persons living near Aliso Canyon gas well or the Exide Technologies Plant
who are injured or killed by toxic chemicals).

526

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 48
their claims upon suspicion of wrongdoing.119 AB 2748 would have provided
victims with an extra year to file a tort claim when they know or have reason to
know that the polluter potentially caused their injury.120 Extending the statute of
limitations benefits plaintiffs procedurally by ensuring their legal claims are not
dismissed on the technicality that they failed to timely file their causes of
action.121
The extension of the statute of limitations prolongs the time to resolve a
claim through litigation and does not offer the repose to the tortfeasor after the
usual two-year statute of limitations for filing a tort claim.122 AB 2748’s
extension of the statute of limitations would thus be inconsistent with the
traditional two-year statute of limitations.123 This adds another year to consider
when the plaintiff was put on reasonable notice to investigate injuries.124 A
plaintiff would have had more time to file suit from the discovery of the injury.125
This is partly due to the California State Legislature recognizing the fact that
victims generally do not have knowledge of the legal actions they could take
when they suffer a toxic substance exposure injury.126 Extending the statute of
limitations for the victims of the Exide and Porter Ranch pollution would give
victims the more time and opportunity to consider their options.127
However, in consideration of advancing the goal of tort law, the California
State Legislature believed AB 2748 would assist plaintiffs in successfully

119. Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112 (1988).
120. AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.85); supra Part
III.A. (discussing the effect the bill would have had on the time period when plaintiffs may file claims).
121. C.f. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 19 Cal.3d 329, 332
(1977) (supporting that that a longer statute of limitations would benefit a plaintiff by allowing more time to file
a claim against a defendant).
122. Jolly, 44 Cal.3d at 1112.
123. Compare AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.85)
(proposing a three year statute of limitations for Porter Ranch and Exide pollution victims of injury and
wrongful death), with CAL. CIV. PROC. §§ 335.1, 340.8 (West 2016) (providing a two-year statute of limitations
for negligence actions for injury and death of an individual and injury and death as a result of hazardous
materials or toxic substances).
124. AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. §§ 340.85(a) & (b));
supra Part III.A. (discussing the effect AB 2748 would have had on the statute of limitations).
125. AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. §§ 340.85(a) & (b));
supra Part III.A (analyzing how AB 2748 would have given procedural benefits to plaintiffs).
126. See generally Abram, supra note 114 (citing that the Department of Public Health has stated that the
trace levels of methane can produce significant long-term health effects); see also ASSEMB. COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT OF AB 2748, at 3 (June 2, 2016) (stating that it is difficult to know what the longterm effects of the methane exposure would be and that additional research will be conducted by the University
of Southern California).
127. Compare AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.85(a),
(b)) (extending a statute of limitations by another year), with Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112
(Cal. 1988) (affirming that extending statute of limitations does not grant defendant with repose in a timely
manner).
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bringing their claims to court.128 Victims occasionally fail to receive
compensation for their injuries because statutes of limitations and waivers
prevent them from gaining access to the courts.129 The California State
Legislature concentrated on the fundamental tort law principles to compensate
victims of injuries and to make their lives whole again when they proposed AB
2748’s new statute of limitation for the Exide and SoCalGas victims.130 Despite
the public policy of enforcing consistent statute of limitations to grant the
defendants repose, AB 2748 would have helped victims bring their claims to
court by leaving a window of opportunity open to bring their claims and
eliminating potential procedural bars in favor of these victims.131
B. Statutory Attorney’s Fees Encourage Settlement
California utilizes the “American Rule” for calculating attorney’s fees.132 The
American Rule provides that each party is to bear their own costs for litigation
unless otherwise negotiated.133 Contrary to the American Rule, AB 2748 would
have provided that plaintiff’s counsel is statutorily entitled to attorney’s fees if a
victim of Exide lead contamination or SoCalGas methane exposure prevails in a

128. See Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal.4th 503, 516 (1994) (citing 6
Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Torts § 1319) (stating that tort damages are awarded to compensate the victim
for injury suffered); Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash.2d 674, 682 (2007) (stating that “tort law protects society’s
interests in freedom from harm, with the goal of restoring the plaintiff to the position he or she was in prior to
the defendant’s harmful conduct”); see also ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT OF AB 2748, at 2
(June 2, 2016) (stating that the bill proposes several remedies to assist persons living near Aliso Canyon gas
well or the Exide Technologies Plant who are injured or killed by toxic chemicals).
129. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 19 Cal.3d 329, 336 (1977)
(finding that the plaintiff’s claim was barred because the claim was filed more than one year after the plaintiff
received notice to file a claim); Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp. 230 Cal.App.3d 1125, 1149–50, 1152–53
(1991) (finding that plaintiff’s causes of action for negligence, negligence per se, and strict liability had expired
as a result of being on notice of injury for more than three years prior to the commencement of a lawsuit).
130. See generally AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.85);
ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT OF AB 2748, at 2 (June 2, 2016) (stating that the bill proposes
several remedies to assist persons living near Aliso Canyon gas well or the Exide Technologies Plant who are
injured or killed by toxic chemicals); see also Applied Equipment, 7 Cal.4th at 516 (citing 6 Witkin, Summary
of Cal. Law, Torts § 1319) (stating that tort damages are awarded to compensate the victim for injury suffered);
Alejandre, 159 Wash.2d at 682 (stating that “tort law protects society’s interests in freedom from harm, with the
goal of restoring the plaintiff to the position he or she was in prior to the defendant’s harmful conduct.”)
131. See AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1544) (fully
disregarding the freedom of contract as an important principle and allowing courts to void contract provisions,
which is contrary to the policy set forth in VL Systems, Inc. v. Unisen, Inc., 152 Cal.App.4th 708, 713 (2007));
see also id. (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 340.85) (disregarding the principle that statutes of limitations are meant
to protect defendants by granting repose, and to stimulate plaintiffs to assert fresh claims against defendants in a
diligent fashion, as set forth in Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110–11 (1988)).
132. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1021 (West 2016); Trope v. Katz, 11 Cal.4th 274, 278 (1995).
133. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1021 (West 2016); Trope, 11 Cal.4th at 278.
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private nuisance action.134 Since attorney’s fees in nuisance actions arising out of
the Exide lead contamination and SoCalGas gas leak would be mandatorily
awarded by statute pursuant to AB 2748, plaintiffs’ counsel would not need to
negotiate with defense counsel who bears the litigation costs.135 AB 2748 would
have automatically pushed the burden of attorney’s fees on the defendant if a
plaintiff prevails.136 Thus, defense counsel is more encouraged to settle nuisance
disputes quickly to lower fees that would be owed to plaintiff’s counsel if
plaintiff ultimately prevails.137
C. No Help With Causation
At the outset, AB 2748 would have helped plaintiffs procedurally in
successfully bringing their claims to court by preventing any waivers of liability
and extending the statute of limitations.138 AB 2748 also encouraged settlement
by statutorily mandating defendants to pay attorney's fees for a prevailing
plaintiff in private nuisance actions—another procedural benefit.139 However,
AB 2748 lacked any substantive benefit—namely, failing to provide any support
to plaintiffs in proving causation in their toxic tort cases.140
Recall, the “insurmountable” problem in toxic tort litigation is the element of
causation in a prima facie case.141 There are “extraordinary and unique burdens
facing plaintiffs who seek to prove causation in toxic-tort litigation.”142 Plaintiffs
must demonstrate their injuries are more likely than not the result of defendant’s
wrongdoing.143 It is challenging for plaintiffs to meet this causation burden when

134. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1021 (West 2016); compare Trope, 11 Cal.4th at 278 (affirming that each party
bears their own costs to litigation), with AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV.
PROC. § 1021.3(a)) (awarding plaintiff’s counsel with attorney’s fees when plaintiff prevails).
135. AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1021.3(a)) (statutorily
awarding plaintiffs’ counsel with attorney’s fees when plaintiff prevails).
136. Id.
137. See generally Kaufman v. Goldman, 195 Cal.App.4th 734, 745 (2011) (citing Zhou v. Unisource
Worldwide, 157 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1475 (2007); quoting Nicholson v. Barab, 233 Cal.App.3d 1671, 1683
(1991) (“[W]e note that there is a well-established policy in the law to discourage litigation and favor
settlement. Pretrial settlements are highly favored because they diminish the expense of litigation.”)).
138. AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1544) (affecting
contracts for waivers of liability); id. (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 340.85) (affecting the statute of limitations for
filing tort actions).
139. Id. (adding CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1021.3(a)).
140. See id. (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1544; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 340.85, 1021.3) (all proposed code
sections failing to discuss the elements of a toxic tort, specifically failing to mention the element of causation).
141. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 585 (1987) (“By far the most difficult problem for
plaintiffs to overcome in toxic tort litigation is the burden of proving causation.”) (citing Developments in the
Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1602, 1617–30 (1986)); Lin, supra note 63, at 1447.
142. Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 125 N.J. 421, 433 (1991).
143. Whiteley v. Philip Morris Inc., 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 696 (2004) (holding that the burden falls on the
plaintiff to prove causation and that California has adopted the substantial factors test to prove causation);
Brinker, supra note 63, at 1297 (discussing that the substantial factors test is “satisfied when two forces are
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the injuries they sustain in the future can be caused by other factors aside from
defendant’s conduct.144 When plaintiffs do not submit evidence to support the
causation element, courts may exclude the evidence and even dismiss the
plaintiffs’ case.145
Not once does AB 2748 address the issue of causation for the victims of
Exide and SoCalGas.146 The extension of the statute of limitations to an
additional year would have prolonged litigation, which also prolongs the time
between the injury and the time litigation commences.147 By extending the time
between litigation and the alleged wrongdoing, more uncertainty builds as to
whether the defendant’s actions or some other factor in fact caused the plaintiff’s
injuries.148 Specifically, the “time lag between the act and an inference of
causation strains the notion of wrongdoing by imposing an obligation to avoid an
act whose adverse consequences may not become manifest for many years.”149
One scholar has described that:
the chief danger is not that a deadly substance [was] released. A far
greater risk is that no one will notice when a substance causes injury
years after an exposure, or causes disease at lower levels of exposure
than were originally thought dangerous, or causes harm when it interacts
with another product, or affects only certain groups of persons, or causes

actively operating, one because of the defendant’s activity, the other not because of any misconduct on his part,
and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another”); see also Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating
General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2121
(1997) (“[P]laintiffs must therefore produce scientific evidence from which a probabilistically based inference
can be drawn that the product in question was capable of causing the health effects in question (general
causation), and then establish that the exposure to defendant’s product was the specific cause of their injury
(specific causation).”)
144. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 6 Cal.4th 965, 1010–12 (1993) (holding plaintiffs’
smoking habits may be considered for comparative fault in a toxic tort action against tire manufacturer for
increasing risk of cancer); see also Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 63, at 110 (discussing difficulties
plaintiffs must overcome in proving causation).
145. Berger, supra note 143, at 2122, n.20 (1997) (indicating that the exclusion of evidence may be
moved in limine, followed by a motion for summary judgment).
146. See AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1544; CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 340.85, 1021.3) (all proposed code sections failing to discuss the elements of a toxic tort, specifically
failing to mention the element of causation).
147. AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 340.85).
148. See generally AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 340.85).
(allowing additional time to pass during a statute of limitations would increase the risk of plaintiffs running into
additional factors that can lead to the same injuries defendants caused, thereby raising additional issues in
causation); Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 63, at 110 (stating that an injury later in time may have
multiple causes); Berger, supra note 143, at 2122 (“[I]t is impossible to tell whether any individual plaintiff’s
injury is attributable to the product or whether it would have manifested itself anyhow.”)
149. Berger, supra note 143, at 2133 (emphasis added).
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too many diverse symptoms for anyone to notice a pattern, especially if
the symptoms are not life-threatening.150
Therefore, leaving the window open for a longer period of time is a blessing
in disguise; the extended period of time potentially raises causation issues in
future litigation for the plaintiff.151
D. Rethinking the Causation Element
Replacing the current causation burden is not a new idea.152 A new model of
proving causation in toxic tort litigation proposes to eliminate general causation
altogether.153 This camp of legal theorists suggests lessening or potentially
eliminating the plaintiff’s burden in proving general causation is viewed as a
“logical extension” to the goals of tort law—deterring wrongful and negligent
conduct and compensating victims for injuries caused by tortfeasors.154 Even
scholars who challenge the abolition of general causation in its entirety call the
abolitionist stance “well intentioned.”155
This proposed causation model, articulated by Professor Margaret A. Berger,
suggests that defendants should be liable if they fail to provide the public with
substantial information relating to the potential risks of injuries.156 The new
model does not require proof that the failure to provide the public with adequate
information caused the plaintiff’s injury.157 Defendants are not liable if they meet
the required standard of care for developing and distributing information relevant
to the potential risks for injury.158 Once the plaintiff proves the defendant failed
to provide information relevant to the risks of toxic exposure, a plaintiff has a
prima facie case for liability.159 Professor Berger’s model affords the defendant
two special defenses for fairness and future research purposes: (1) that certain
health reactions could not arise from exposure to the toxic substance, and (2) that

150. Id. at 2118.
151. See generally AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 340.85)
(allowing additional time to pass during a statute of limitations would increase the risk of plaintiffs running into
additional causes that can lead to the same injuries defendants caused, thereby raising additional issues in
causation).
152. See generally Berger, supra note 143 (proposing to abolish the burden of proving general causation);
Alani Golanski, General Causation at a Crossroads in Toxic Tort Cases, 107 PENN ST. L. REV. 479, 483 (2003)
(suggesting to place more emphasis on epidemiological studies to help prove causation).
153. Berger, supra note 143, at 2143.
154. Id. at 2140 (citing Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 936–37 (Cal. 1980); Summers v. Tice, 199
P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948) (both cases relieving plaintiffs of the burdens of proving causation by shifting the burden
to defendants who are more knowledgeable about the product).
155. Golanski, supra note 152, at 483.
156. Berger, supra note 143, at 2143.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2144.
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other causes caused the plaintiff’s injuries.160 Under this model, causation
essentially becomes a “burden-shifting mechanism.”161
Professor Berger’s “abolitionist” point of view for eliminating general
causation and shifting the burden to defendants is not unchallenged.162 First,
Berger’s model presupposes risks exist with the product.163 “[B]y assuming the
existence of the very factual element that the abolitionist paradigm is committed
to eliminating, that paradigm is rendered incoherent.”164
In support of the abolition of general causation, Professor Berger further
argues that the new causation model eliminates the costs and time the plaintiff
spends on establishing causation through expert witnesses.165 While costs and
time will be spent on showing that the defendant failed to warn, these costs are
cheaper than hiring experts to prove causation under the traditional tort model.166
The model also allows defendants to assess their own liability.167 Overall, there
would be more equitable compensation for victims, lower litigation and
transaction fees, and less court congestion—all of which promote the goals of
tort law.168 The current system of causation fails to promote these goals, and is
“antithetical to tort law objectives.”169 However, it is “not immediately apparent
that transaction costs would ordinarily exceed the value of such trade-off, and it
seems reasonable to suppose that, indeed, the latter would often far surpass the
former.”170
Challengers to the abolitionist position “assume that the abolitionists’
position will not withstand the test of time.”171 Instead, these challengers
recognize a causation issue and deem the current tort system “adaptable enough”
to resolve complex and nonobvious causal mechanisms by “adopting casespecific epidemiological studies.”172 Essentially, challengers of Professor
Berger’s position believe that it would be better to incorporate epidemiological
studies “harmoniz[ing] with the current flow of tort jurisprudence than [the]
outright abolition of the causal element of proof.”173 These anti-abolitionists

160. Id.
161. Golanski, supra note 152, at 482.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Berger, supra note 143, at 2149–50.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2150.
168. Id.; see generally Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal.4th 503, 516 (1994)
(finding that tort damages are awarded to compensate victims for injuries suffered from a defendant’s tortious
conduct).
169. Berger, supra note 143, at 2119.
170. Golanski, supra note 152, at 483.
171. Id. at 485.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 486.
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suggest what is known as an epidemiological174 alternative.175 One issue is
whether such epidemiological studies supporting general causation issues can be
used as the “sole or predominant evidence” to prove specific causation.176 The
anti-abolitionists find that:
courts facing the issue [of whether an epidemiological study can prove
specific causation] thus appeared willing to accept an epidemiological
substitute for specific causal evidence if that statistical proof established
a greater than two-fold relative risk, and thereby satisfied, in the judicial
reckoning, the more-likely-than-not standard.177
Unlike the model Professor Berger proposes, the epidemiological studies that
have statistical proof greater than a two-fold relative risk has been adopted in
narrow situations.178
A notable example of how epidemiological studies played a significant role
with the causation element is In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation.179
There, a class of veteran plaintiffs brought suit for exposure to herbicides while
serving in Vietnam.180 “The [epidemiological] evidence provided by the plaintiffs
to date on general causality, while supportive of the desirability of further
studies, lack sufficient probative force.”181 The lower court found that at least a
two-fold increase in incidence of the disease must attribute the injury as a result
of the defendant’s use of chemicals to permit recovery “if epidemiological
studies were relied on alone.”182 The United States Court of Appeal for the
Second Circuit affirmed that the plaintiffs must prove at least a two-fold increase
in the incidence of the disease allegedly caused by exposure to the suspected
toxic substance.183
Overall, courts are not moved to adopt newer models of causation.184 Even
though the courts recognize the causation hurdles that plaintiffs experience,

174. Lesson 1: Introduction to Epidemiology, Section 1: Definition of Epidemiology, Centers of Disease
Control and Prevention, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Sept. 2, 2016), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ophss/csels/dsepd/ss1978/lesson1/section1.html (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (defining ‘epidemiology’ as the “study of the distribution and determinants of health-related states
or events in specified populations, and the application of this study to the control of health problems”).
175. Golanski, supra note 152, at 496.
176. Id. at 488.
177. Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 489–90 (citations omitted).
179. In re Agent Orange Product Liab. Litig., 597 F.Supp. 740, 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145
(2d Cir. 1987).
180. Id. at 746.
181. Id. at 782–83.
182. Id. at 785.
183. In re Agent Orange Product Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 174 (2d Cir. 1987).
184. James v. Bessemer Processing Co., Inc., 155 N.J. 279, 300 (1998).
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courts are satisfied with the current status of tort litigation.185 If the California
State Legislature’s goals intend to aid plaintiffs with their recovery, “justice
requires a change in the substantive law” rather than procedural benefits afforded
by AB 2748.186 Instead of merely changing procedural grounds for plaintiffs to
bring their claims, changing the causation model may do more to promote justice
and deter wrongful conduct.187
E. The Governor’s Veto
Prior to the Governor’s veto, AB 2748 received 23 “Ayes” and 13 “Noes” in
the California State Senate on August 23, 2016.188 AB 2748 received 54 “Ayes”
to 23 “Noes” in the California State Assembly on August 30, 2016.189 Despite the
support from both houses of the California State Legislature, AB 2748 will not
take effect because the Governor ultimately vetoed the bill on September 26,
2016.190
In a letter containing his veto message to the Members of the California State
Assembly, Governor Jerry Brown claimed that the bill restricts the use of release
clauses and waivers, which “eliminates incentives for defendants to settle legal
disputes stemming from these two unrelated incidents.”191 Second, “nothing has
been shown to indicate current law is insufficient to hold polluters
accountable.”192 The “many direct actions and lawsuits that have been filed on
behalf of the state and affected communities” and the public interest in
incentivizing defendants to settle legal disputes outside the courtroom led
Governor Brown to veto AB 2748 altogether.193 Perhaps AB 2748 would have
been passed if these protections were expanded to “other communities that may
be similarly affected by future environmental disasters.”194

185. Id.; see generally Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 133
F.Supp.2d 162, 174 (E.D.N.Y 2001) (exemplifying this tolerant attitude in the courts).
186. Berger, supra note 143, at 2152.
187. Compare AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1544; CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 340.85, 1021.3) (all proposed code sections failing to discuss the elements of a toxic tort,
specifically failing to mention the element of causation), with Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash.2d 674, 682 (2007)
(stating that “tort law protects society’s interests in freedom from harm, with the goal of restoring the plaintiff
to the position he or she was in prior to the defendant’s harmful conduct”).
188. ASSEMB. FLOOR, COMM. ANALYSIS OF AB 2748, at 1 (Sept. 30, 2016).
189. Id.
190. Brown, supra note 4.
191. Id.
192. Id .
193. Id.
194. SEN. COMM. ON ENV. QUALITY, COMM. REPORT OF AB 2748, at 5 (June 28, 2016).
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V. CONCLUSION
AB 2748 was the California State Legislature’s response to the lead
contamination and methane gas leak environmental disasters in Southern
California in 2015.195 Although AB 2748 would have encouraged parties to settle
cases by imposing statutorily mandated attorney’s fees in private nuisance
actions,196 AB 2748 would have only provided procedural benefits—specifically,
leaving litigation as an open route for recovery by rendering waivers of liability
ineffective and extending a statute of limitations to three years.197
AB 2748 does not offer substantive resolutions to the issues of causation
arising in toxic tort litigation.198 By leaving the window open to litigation for a
longer period of time, causation would increasingly be harder to prove under the
traditional causation model.199 If the goal is to help injured plaintiffs recover and
deter wrongful conduct, the California State Legislature should reexamine how
plaintiffs can pass the causation hurdle in litigation, the “central, decisive factor”
in toxic tort litigation.200

195. Brown, supra note 4.
196. Supra Part IV.B (discussing the impact AB 2748 would have had on the incentives for parties to
settle).
197. Supra Parts III, IV.A.1 & IV.A.2 (analyzing the procedural benefits AB 2748 would have conferred
on plaintiffs in such cases).
198. AB 2748, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. CIV. CODE § 1544; CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 340.85, 1021.3) (all proposed code sections failing to discuss the elements of a toxic tort, specifically failing
to mention the element of causation).
199. Berger, supra note 143, at 2133.
200. Id. at 2144; supra Part IV.D (discussing how causation is the most difficult factor for plaintiffs to
prove in tort litigation).
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